Agriculture has always lived with biological risk, but the scale and frequency of recent outbreaks have changed the way the sector needs to think about biosecurity. An outbreak of avian influenza in poultry can empty shelves and push up prices. A livestock disease can disrupt trade and leave producers carrying losses for months.
A crop pest can weaken yields and undermine export confidence over several seasons. What was once seen as a contained production problem is now clearly a system-wide threat across livestock, grains, fruit and vegetables, with implications for food security, trade and the resilience of the agricultural value chain.
When biosecurity breaks down, the effects move quickly beyond the farm gate. Producers face direct losses, added costs and disrupted trading patterns, while export channels come under pressure, supply tightens and prices respond. The strain runs through the value chain and into the wider economy.
These are also rarely short-lived events. Recovery is often uneven, solutions are not always immediately available, and the path back to stability depends on a mix of science, regulation, industry action and practical adaptation.
The scale of impact often surprises people outside the sector. During the 2021 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, which was limited to Mpumalanga, North West and Limpopo, the red meat industry alone absorbed estimated losses of about R2.1 billion.
The current, far more widespread outbreak is likely to exceed that by a wide margin once its full cost is calculated. Avian influenza created similar disruption in poultry, forcing South Africa into the unusual position of importing eggs and breeding stock. These incidents differ in form, but both show how biosecurity failures can become prolonged, multi-year disruptions rather than isolated setbacks.
This reality has become a key point of discussion with producers, agribusinesses and value‑chain stakeholders gathering at NAMPO, where the emphasis is increasingly on preparedness rather than reaction.
This is why biosecurity demands a more honest and collaborative response from all stakeholders. In the case of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), the current crisis exposed both government and industry failures. Surveillance protocols that had been in place for decades were not adequately enforced, and livestock movements occurred in ways that accelerated the spread of the disease.
South Africa now finds itself on the path to ‘FMD-free-with-vaccination’ status – the same route Brazil navigated over a period of 15 to 20 years. It is not a quick fix; it’s a national programme that will require sustained discipline, continued investment and a willingness to accept that the learning process is not yet complete.
Perhaps most importantly, the current FMD crisis offers one of the most important lessons the agriculture sector needs to learn, which is that it cannot rely on reactive thinking in the face of recurring biological threats. Once an outbreak is visible, the cost is often already mounting.
Producers may be forced to hold stock longer than planned, rework production strategies, absorb higher input costs or manage interruptions to established markets. By that stage, the conversation is no longer only about containment; it is about survival, continuity and how to preserve the productive base of the business.
A more effective approach is one that begins with recognising biosecurity as a permanent feature of agricultural risk management. The understanding needs to be built into daily operations, long-term planning and investment decisions, rather than being treated as an emergency item to be addressed only when a situation arises. That means stronger on-farm protocols, better compliance, better surveillance and a far more coordinated approach between public institutions, industry bodies, researchers and producers themselves.
Financial institutions are also closer to the issue than many assume. As capital providers to the sector, banks are directly exposed when biological disruption becomes financial disruption. That means biosecurity becomes an intergral part of lending and risk conversations long before any outbreak occurs. A producer’s management practices, including biosecurity protocols, are part of the broader picture of resilience and sustainability.
The bank’s role becomes even more important during a crisis. There is no standard response for producers affected by a biosecurity event. Support may involve restructuring, temporary relief or other tailored interventions, depending on the commodity, the severity of the disruption and the financial position of the business. None of that works without trust and transparency between banker and client.
There is also a broader role for financial institutions in helping connect realities on the ground with industry and policy responses. Because banks work across value chains and engage closely with producers, they have visibility into the pressures building at farm level and across sectors. That gives them a useful role in industry-wide engagement, whether through organised banking structures, sector bodies or collaborative efforts that support practical solutions.
Still, the responsibility cannot sit with the bank, or with any single other stakeholder. Government still has a central role in maintaining the institutional capacity that underpins national biosecurity, from surveillance and diagnostics to research, regulation and vaccine readiness. Rebuilding that capacity should be a priority, ideally through stronger public‑private collaboration.
As conversations at NAMPO continue, the central question remains not only how the sector manages the next outbreak, but how it builds a system that is better prepared for the next decade. That requires a shift from crisis response to long-term resilience, with biosecurity treated as a strategic priority across the agricultural economy.
By Dawie Maree, Head of Agriculture Information and Marketing at FNB Business, and Paul Makube, Senior Agricultural Economist at First National Bank
